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What is Heads?
Heads is an open-source custom firmware and OS configuration for laptops and servers, built on coreboot with a Linux boot loader in ROM. Its goal is to provide somewhat better physical security and data protection than a standard installation by moving the root of trust into the write-protected region of the SPI flash. From there it measures each step of the boot process into the TPM, so the machine can attest to you or a remote system that it hasn't been tampered with, and once in a known good state the TPM is used as hardware key storage to decrypt the drive. The hypervisor, kernel and initrd images are signed with keys the user controls.
How it differs from a privacy OS
Unlike Tails, which aims to be stateless and leave no trace, Heads is designed for the case where you need to store data and state on the computer. It is not simply another Linux distribution: it combines physical hardening of specific hardware platforms and flash security features with custom firmware. On platforms that support it, Bootguard enforces verified boot of the firmware. Modern Intel CPUs still require binary blobs to boot, but these non-free components are included in the measurements and are at least guaranteed to be unchanging.
Who it is for, and the trade-offs
It suits people who want persistent, encrypted data on a machine they physically control and who are willing to work within a narrow set of supported hardware. The trade-off is that this is not a drop-in install for arbitrary laptops; the hardening depends on specific platforms, and the project describes its work as raising the difficulty of attack rather than securing against every vector. If your need is a disposable session with no local traces, a stateless OS fits better; if your concern is tampering with the boot chain and drive on a machine you keep, Heads addresses that class of attack.
A useful next step is to check whether your exact laptop or server model appears in the project's supported-platform documentation before planning a deployment. Heads Wiki
How does Heads protect a laptop or server from physical tampering during boot?
Heads protects against physical tampering by moving the root of trust into hardware the attacker cannot easily rewrite, then using that anchor to detect changes before your data is unlocked. Per the project's own documentation, it combines custom coreboot firmware and a Linux boot loader in ROM with physical hardening of specific hardware platforms and SPI flash write protection. Because the first instruction the CPU executes is under Heads' control, each stage of the boot firmware and configuration is measured into the TPM. That lets the machine attest to you (or a remote system) that it has not been tampered with. Once the system reaches a known good state, the TPM acts as hardware key storage to decrypt the drive; the hypervisor, kernel and initrd images are signed with keys you control. Where the platform supports it, Bootguard enforces verified boot of the firmware, and non-free Intel blobs are included in the measurements so they are at least guaranteed to be unchanging. The project is explicit that this raises the cost of attack rather than closing every vector.
What this looks like in practice
- Evil-maid swap of the boot code: an attacker with brief physical access reflashes the firmware. Write-protected SPI flash and measured boot make the altered code show up as a changed measurement rather than booting silently.
- DMA attacks over Thunderbolt: the 33C3 talk by Trammel Hudson, cited on the page, describes Thunderstrike-style DMA rewriting of SPI flash and Heads' countermeasures, such as enabling IOMMU/VT-d and having coreboot disable the relevant ports.
- Stolen or seized machine: the drive stays encrypted until the TPM unseals it in a verified state, so pulling the disk does not hand over data.
Where it fits, and where it doesn't
Heads is aimed at laptops and servers where you need to keep data and state on the machine, in contrast to Tails' stateless design. It is not a general-purpose distribution: it targets specific hardware platforms, so check that your model is supported before planning a deployment. It also does not defend against every attack class, and the page itself frames the goal as making attacks expensive rather than impossible.
A useful next step is to read the supported-platforms and flashing guidance on Heads and confirm your exact laptop or server model is listed, since the protection depends on platform-specific hardening and flash write protection being available.
What hardware platforms and laptops are supported by Heads firmware?
Heads is built for specific, individually supported laptops and servers rather than a broad hardware list. The project describes itself as open-source custom firmware plus an OS configuration for laptops and servers, with physical hardening tied to particular platforms and coreboot support. Its documentation is the place to confirm whether a given machine is supported.
How support is organized
Heads' support is platform-specific in a way that matters when choosing hardware:
- Laptops and workstations are the primary target, with the boot firmware and Linux bootloader placed in the write-protected SPI flash region.
- Servers are addressed through BMC, SSH or console access, as shown by the split main menu on the project's wiki.
- Firmware-level verification depends on the platform: Heads notes that Bootguard enforces verified boot of the firmware "on platforms that support it," so this protection is not universal across supported machines.
- Intel-based systems require binary blobs to boot; Heads includes these non-free components in its measurements so they are at least guaranteed to be unchanging.
A practical way to decide
If you are considering a laptop for a Heads install, start from the project's supported-device documentation rather than from a general "works with coreboot" list. Check three things for your exact model: that it is listed as supported, whether Bootguard-backed verified boot applies to it, and whether flashing the SPI flash is feasible on that machine. A concrete example: someone buying a used business-class ThinkPad for a tamper-evident travel machine should confirm the exact model appears in Heads' support documentation before purchase, because a near-identical variant may lack the same protections or flashing path.
For background on the project's goals and the attack classes it targets, see Heads Wiki.
How do I install Heads on my machine, and what are the risks?
Installing Heads means replacing your machine's firmware with a custom coreboot build plus a Linux boot loader in ROM, then configuring it to measure each boot step into the TPM. The wiki positions it as firmware and OS configuration for laptops and servers, not a distribution you install alongside an existing system. The practical answer is: check hardware support first, install only through the documented procedure for your exact board, and accept that a mistake can leave the machine unbootable until you recover it with external flashing hardware.
What the installation actually involves
- Verify your platform is supported. Heads combines "physical hardening of specific hardware platforms" with coreboot firmware, so support is board-specific. Confirm your exact model appears in the project's supported-devices documentation before touching anything.
- Plan for an external flash. Because the root of trust moves into the write-protected SPI flash region, initial installation is normally done by writing the firmware image directly to the flash chip with a hardware programmer, not by running an installer from the OS.
- Prepare recovery before you start. Keep a full dump of your original firmware and a way to re-flash it. This is your only reliable path back if the new image fails to boot.
- Set up keys and TPM enrollment. Heads signs the hypervisor, kernel and initrd with keys you control, and uses the TPM to attest boot integrity and later to decrypt the drive once the system is in a known good state. Budget time for key generation, signing your boot files, and TPM provisioning.
The risks, concretely
| Risk | What it means for you |
|---|---|
| Bricking | A bad flash or interrupted write can leave the machine dead until re-flashed externally; some boards need case disassembly or a clip. |
| Irreversible or hard-to-reverse changes | Write-protecting the flash and enabling Bootguard-style verified boot on supported platforms makes later firmware changes harder. |
| Losing drive access | Drive decryption is tied to the TPM and a known good measurement state; a failed boot measurement or TPM reset can lock you out without a recovery key. |
| Signed-boot friction | Every kernel or initrd update must be signed with your keys, so routine OS maintenance becomes a manual step. |
| Incomplete protection | The project itself notes these changes don't secure against every attack vector; they raise the cost of boot-process and physical attacks. |
| Non-free components remain | On modern Intel CPUs, binary blobs are still required to boot; Heads only measures them so they are guaranteed unchanging. |
A sensible next step
Read the board-specific install page for your exact model and the project's recovery documentation before buying a programmer. As a decision criterion: if you are not comfortable opening the machine, using a hardware flasher, and managing your own signing keys, the risk of a bricked laptop outweighs the boot-integrity benefits. If you are, the wiki at Heads is the authoritative starting point, and coreboot's own documentation at coreboot explains the underlying firmware your board will run.
How does Heads differ from Tails or a standard Linux distribution?
Heads is not a privacy-focused live OS like Tails, and it is not a conventional Linux distribution you install and update like any other. It is custom coreboot firmware plus a Linux bootloader in ROM, designed for machines where you keep data and state on the disk—and it moves the root of trust into the write-protected SPI flash region.
How it differs
| Dimension | Heads | Tails | Standard Linux distribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary aim | Physical security and tamper evidence for a machine that stores data | Stateless, amnesic use that leaves no trace | General-purpose computing |
| Where trust starts | Write-protected firmware in SPI flash; CPU's first instruction is controlled | Boot medium and the running live system | Bootloader and OS on disk, assumed intact |
| Boot integrity | Measures each boot step into the TPM; attests to the user or a remote system | Focuses on leaving no local trace, not on hardware attestation | Typically no boot measurement or attestation by default |
| State | Data and state persist on the machine; drive decrypted using the TPM once in a known good state | No persistent state by design | Persistent by default |
| Signed components | Hypervisor, kernel and initrd signed with user-controlled keys | Distribution-signed images | Distribution-signed packages and kernels |
| Hardware scope | Specific laptop and server platforms with physical hardening and flash protections | Broad PC hardware via removable media | Broad hardware |
The practical consequence: with a standard distribution, an attacker who can rewrite the boot code or tamper with the firmware can often do so without leaving evidence. Heads makes that class of attack harder by measuring the boot chain and by enforcing verified boot where the platform supports Bootguard. It also addresses attacks that traditional installs neglect—the project cites Thunderstrike-style DMA over Thunderbolt rewriting SPI flash, countered by enabling IOMMU/VT-d and coreboot disabling the relevant interfaces.
Two trade-offs are worth stating plainly. First, Heads does not eliminate binary blobs: modern Intel CPUs need them to boot, though they are included in the measurements and therefore at least guaranteed to be unchanging. Second, the project is explicit that this raises the cost of attack rather than securing against every vector.
Choosing between them
If your concern is that a seized or accessed laptop reveals what you did, Tails is the fit. If your concern is that someone has quietly modified your machine's boot process while your data stays on it, Heads targets that threat. If you just need a working desktop, a standard distribution remains the simpler choice—Heads requires supported hardware and a willingness to manage signing keys.
As a concrete case: a journalist who travels with a work laptop and keeps sources on disk benefits more from Heads' boot measurement and TPM-bound disk decryption than from an amnesic OS, because the data must survive the trip.
A useful next step is to check the Heads wiki's supported-platform list before assuming your laptop qualifies, since the hardware hardening is platform-specific rather than generic.
How can I support or contribute to the Heads project?
The Heads project's own wiki says the clearest way to help is money: the firmware and wiki are free and open source, but keeping them maintained is ongoing work, and the project points to GitHub Sponsors (tlaurion) and Open Collective (Insurgo), with details on its Community page. Contributions of code, testing and documentation aren't spelled out on the page you supplied, so treat those as the usual open-source routes rather than documented asks.
Who this fits
- You run Heads on a laptop or server: the most valuable non-financial help is reporting what works and what breaks on your specific hardware, since Heads depends on per-platform hardening and flash protection.
- You're evaluating it for an organisation: funding through a sponsor channel is a low-effort way to keep the boot chain you rely on audited and updated.
- You're a firmware developer: Heads builds on coreboot and a Linux boot loader in ROM, so familiarity with coreboot, TPM measurement and signing keys is the relevant background.
Practical next step
Pick one contribution and make it concrete: a monthly sponsorship at whatever level suits you, or a reproducible test report on your exact machine model and firmware version. The second costs nothing and directly helps other users decide whether Heads fits their hardware.
For background on the wider ecosystem Heads sits in, see coreboot and the Heads project's own documentation at Heads.
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