docs.xeol.io

What is Xeol?

Xeol is a tool for securing how you use open source by identifying and fixing end-of-life, outdated and unmaintained dependencies. Its own documentation defines end-of-life software as software no longer supported by its publisher and therefore no longer receiving security fixes; outdated and unmaintained packages generally fall into the same category. The name is pronounced "Zee-O-L," as in EOL with a Z in front.

Who it is for

The clearest fit is a team that ships software built on open-source libraries and needs to know which dependencies have stopped receiving security patches. That covers security engineers auditing a codebase, backend and platform teams maintaining long-lived services, and DevOps or SRE groups who want dependency risk visible before it becomes an incident. The project comes from two technical founders with backgrounds leading security, backend, DevOps and SRE teams, so the framing is aimed at practitioners rather than procurement.

What it does and does not claim

The documentation positions Xeol around one job: finding end-of-life and unmaintained dependencies and helping fix them. It does not present itself as a general vulnerability scanner or a full software composition analysis suite, so treat it as a focused check on dependency lifecycle status rather than a replacement for broader security tooling.

A practical next step

If you maintain a service with a large dependency tree, start by identifying which packages are already past their publisher's support window, since those carry the most direct security exposure. From there, decide whether the priority is upgrading, replacing or formally accepting the risk. For background on how end-of-life timelines are tracked across open-source projects, endoflife.date is a useful reference. To reach the maintainers directly, the documentation lists [email protected].

How does Xeol identify end-of-life and unmaintained open source dependencies?

Xeol's documentation describes the product as identifying and fixing end-of-life, outdated and unmaintained dependencies, with EOL software defined as packages no longer supported by their publishers and therefore no longer receiving security fixes. The page frames outdated and unmaintained packages as generally falling into that same risk category. It does not, however, publish the detection method—such as whether it matches dependency versions against upstream release and support data, scans lockfiles and manifests, or checks maintenance signals like last release date or archived repositories. Treat "how it identifies" as undocumented on this page rather than assume a specific mechanism.

For a practical next step, a team evaluating Xeol should ask the founders directly which ecosystems and package managers are supported, what data sources feed the EOL determinations, and how findings are surfaced (for example, in CI or pull requests). The page invites contact at [email protected] and notes the company is run by two technical founders with security, backend, DevOps and SRE backgrounds—useful when judging whether their support-data approach matches your stack.

A concrete scenario: a backend team maintaining a service with a large transitive dependency tree wants to know which packages have crossed EOL before an audit. The relevant question is not just "does it flag EOL packages" but "how current and how explainable are those flags"—so request a sample report showing the evidence behind each finding. For general context on end-of-life timelines, endoflife.date tracks support windows for many projects and can help you sanity-check any tool's conclusions.

What makes end-of-life software a security risk compared to outdated software?

End-of-life (EOL) software is a distinct security problem from software that is merely outdated. Per Xeol's documentation, EOL software is no longer supported by its publisher and therefore receives no security fixes at all. Outdated software may be behind on updates but still has a maintainer who can patch it. That difference is the core of the risk.

Why the distinction matters

• No patch path for EOL code. Once a project reaches end-of-life, newly discovered vulnerabilities stay unpatched. An attacker who finds a flaw has a permanent window, not a temporary one.
• Outdated but maintained code can recover. A lagging dependency is exposed only until you upgrade. The exposure is a timing problem, not a structural one.
• Unmaintained projects blur the line. Xeol groups outdated and unmaintained software with EOL because the practical outcome is similar: no reliable source of fixes. Treat "no active maintainer" as EOL for risk purposes.

A concrete scenario

A team runs a web service with two old libraries. One is a maintained package two minor versions behind; the other is a framework branch the vendor stopped supporting last year. A CVE lands in both. The first gets a patch the team can apply within days. The second gets nothing, so the team must either migrate off the framework or wrap it in compensating controls such as network isolation and extra monitoring. The second library is the real liability, even if both look "old" on a dependency report.

Next step

Inventory dependencies and classify each by support status, not version age. Prioritize replacement or isolation for anything with no active maintainer, and schedule routine upgrades for the merely outdated. Xeol's stated focus is exactly this: identifying and fixing end-of-life, outdated, and unmaintained dependencies. For background on support timelines, the endoflife.date project at endoflife.date tracks published end-of-life dates across common projects.

How can I get started integrating Xeol into my existing development workflow?

Start with the documentation index on Xeol and treat integration as a dependency-audit step you add to your existing pipeline, not a replacement for it. Xeol's stated focus is identifying and fixing end-of-life, outdated and unmaintained open-source dependencies, so the practical first move is to point it at a repository you already build regularly and see what it flags.

A concrete first pass

1. Pick one service with a well-known dependency file (a lockfile or manifest) and a build you can reproduce.
2. Run the audit against that repository and record which findings are true EOL packages versus merely old versions.
3. Decide a policy per finding: upgrade now, pin and schedule, or accept with a documented reason.
4. Only then wire the check into CI, so the first pipeline run doesn't drown the team in noise.

Where it fits in a workflow

The scheduled scan matters most: a dependency that was fine at merge can lose publisher support months later, which is exactly the drift Xeol describes. Assign each scheduled finding to a service owner rather than a shared channel.

Decision criteria

If your team already runs a software composition analysis tool, check whether it reports maintenance status or only known CVEs. EOL detection answers a different question, so overlap is usually partial. For a small team without dedicated security staff, start with the pull request check and a monthly scan; for a regulated environment, add the documented acceptance step so auditors can see why a flagged package was kept.

The founders are reachable at [email protected] if you want to confirm how the audit fits a specific stack before committing pipeline time.

How does Xeol handle the data it scans from my repositories?

The documentation does not describe how scanned repository data is handled. The page introduces Xeol as a tool for identifying and fixing end-of-life, outdated and unmaintained open-source dependencies, and describes the founders' security, backend, DevOps and SRE backgrounds, but it contains no detail on data storage, retention, access controls, encryption or whether scanning is local or cloud-based. Anything specific about repository data handling would need to come from Xeol directly rather than from this page.

What the page does establish

• Xeol's focus is dependency lifecycle risk: flagging software no longer supported by its publisher and therefore no longer receiving security fixes.
• The team presents itself as security-focused, which is relevant context but not a data-handling commitment.
• The page lists a contact address for reaching the founders, which is the practical route for a direct answer.

A useful next step

If you are evaluating Xeol for repositories containing sensitive code, treat data handling as an open question until confirmed in writing. Ask specifically:

1. Whether source code is read in place or copied to Xeol infrastructure, and where that infrastructure runs.
2. What is retained after a scan completes, and for how long.
3. Which individuals can access scan results, and under what access controls.
4. Whether results can be deleted on request, and how quickly.

For general comparison, established software supply chain and dependency scanning vendors publish security and privacy documentation you can review alongside Xeol's answer — for example Snyk and endoflife.date, the latter being a reference dataset for end-of-life dates rather than a scanner. Comparing their published practices gives you a baseline for judging whatever Xeol tells you.

Who are the founders behind Xeol and what experience do they bring to the project?

Xeol is led by two technical founders who met during the founding stages of an AI unicorn and have worked together for five years. Their backgrounds span security, backend engineering, DevOps and site reliability engineering (SRE), and they have led teams in each of those areas. That mix is directly relevant to what Xeol does: spotting end-of-life, outdated and unmaintained open-source dependencies is a security problem, but acting on it at scale is an engineering and operations problem—knowing which services depend on a package, how upgrades roll out, and what breaks in production. The documentation does not name the founders individually or give prior employers, so treat the above as the extent of what is stated.

For a practical next step, if you are evaluating Xeol, use that background as a lens for questions rather than as a credential in itself. Ask how findings are prioritized for a team with limited upgrade capacity, how the tool distinguishes a genuinely unmaintained package from a slow-moving but supported one, and what evidence it gives for each end-of-life call. A useful decision criterion: if your main pain is not knowing what is outdated, the security focus fits; if your pain is coordinating upgrades across many teams, probe how the product supports that workflow. The founders invite direct contact at [email protected], which is a reasonable route for exactly these questions. For general context on end-of-life software risk, endoflife.date tracks support timelines for many projects.