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What is SecureAuth used for?
SecureAuth is used to govern AI agents that are already running inside an enterprise. Rather than managing human logins, it focuses on the non-human identities and autonomous agents that act across applications, data and workflows. Its purpose is to answer three questions: which agents exist, what authority they carry, and whether each action should be allowed at the moment it happens.
Core uses
- Agent and non-human identity discovery — find agents in operation, the identities they use, and the tools they can reach.
- Delegated access tracing — see who authorized an agent, how far that authority extends, and where it has been exercised.
- Runtime policy enforcement — evaluate each agent request against policy, risk and context before the agent acts.
- Action-level decisions — allow, deny, redact, throttle, escalate or require human approval.
- Data redaction — strip sensitive data before it reaches an agent or leaves a system.
Who it is for
Security, identity and platform teams in larger organizations that have adopted AI agents faster than their access controls can keep up. The page frames the problem in terms of agents holding long-lived credentials with full user or system permissions, spending that arrives as unexplained invoices, and scattered evidence of what agents did.
A practical scenario
An agent is authorized once by an employee, then keeps acting for weeks. It reads a customer database, calls an internal API and triggers a payment. With SecureAuth, the security team can trace that authority back to the employee, see which data classes the agent touched, and block or require approval for the payment call at runtime instead of discovering it after the fact.
Decision criterion
Choose this category of tool if your main gap is runtime control over agent actions and delegated authority. If your problem is only inventorying agents, discovery alone may be enough; SecureAuth's differentiator is combining discovery with enforcement at the point of action.
Next step: list your agents by how they authenticate — delegated by a person, service account, or fully autonomous — and check whether any of them can move money or read regulated data without an inspection step. Pricing details are listed on SecureAuth.
How does SecureAuth discover AI agents and non-human identities across an enterprise?
SecureAuth addresses discovery through a capability it calls Agent & NHI Discovery, which is part of its Agent Authority platform. According to the product page, it identifies which AI agents are running, the identities those agents use, and the tools they can reach.
What discovery covers
The platform is framed around three connected views:
- Agent and NHI discovery — surfaces agents currently operating, their underlying identities, and accessible tools.
- Delegated access tracing — follows who authorized each agent, how far that authority extends, and where it has been exercised.
- Agent topology — maps the whole estate in one graph: teams, the agents they run, the policies governing their calls, and the MCP servers they reach.
SecureAuth also claims a "real time" discovery capability, suggesting agents are detected as they appear rather than only through periodic audits. The page distinguishes three agent types it accounts for: employee-delegated agents, service accounts, and fully autonomous agents.
Why this matters in practice
Discovery is the prerequisite for the rest of the platform. The page's own framing of the problem is that agents often receive access once and then act repeatedly across applications, data, and workflows using long-lived credentials that outlast the original task. Without an inventory, you cannot trace delegated authority or enforce policy at the point of action. A useful evaluation step is to ask a vendor to demonstrate discovery against agents you already know exist — including shadow agents spun up by individual teams — and to show how quickly a newly created agent appears in the topology graph.
For related context on identity governance across human and machine identities, see Okta and CyberArk.
How can I trace who authorized an AI agent and where its delegated access was used?
SecureAuth's Agent Authority is built for exactly this question: it includes delegated-access tracing that shows who authorized an agent, how far that authority reaches, and where it has been used. That maps to two separate jobs you should keep distinct: attribution (which human, team or system granted the authority) and usage (which calls that authority actually produced).
How the two halves fit together
- Authorization chain. Start from the agent identity and walk back to its grant: an employee's delegated consent, a service account, or an autonomous registration. Record the grantor, the time of grant, and the scope it carried.
- Reach. Translate that scope into concrete resources — which identities touch which data classes, and where sensitive calls land. SecureAuth presents this as an agent topology graph and an "agent reach" view.
- Usage. For each action, capture the agent, the acting identity, the tool or MCP server, the target resource, and the decision made at the time.
What to look for in any tool
| Capability | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Identity linkage | Without a stable agent ID, you cannot join a grant to its later calls |
| Delegation depth | Chained delegation hides the original authorizer |
| Runtime decision log | Post-hoc logs miss actions that were never inspected |
| Scope-to-resource mapping | Shows blast radius in data terms, not permission names |
A practical next step
Pick one high-risk agent — something that reads customer data or moves money — and reconstruct its full chain manually: grantor, credential type, tools reached, and the last 30 days of calls. If you cannot complete that chain from existing logs, that gap is your first requirement. SecureAuth's runtime enforcement adds a decision point before each action (allow, deny, redact, throttle, escalate, or require human approval), which also gives you a cleaner audit record than log reconstruction alone.
Trade-off to weigh
Runtime enforcement gives better evidence but adds a policy layer between agents and tools; expect integration work and some latency, and plan who owns policy exceptions. If your immediate need is only retrospective tracing, discovery plus delegated-access views may be enough to start.
To see how the pieces are grouped, check SecureAuth and its Agent Authority material.
How does SecureAuth enforce runtime policies before an AI agent acts?
SecureAuth enforces runtime policy at the point of action: every agent request is evaluated against policy, risk, and context before the agent is allowed to proceed, and the outcome is one of a fixed set of decisions — allow, deny, redact, throttle, escalate, or require human approval. The intent is to stop the pattern where an agent receives access once and then acts freely across applications, data, and workflows on long-lived credentials.
Three capabilities work together to make that decision meaningful:
- Agent and non-human identity discovery — identifies which agents are running, the identities they use, and the tools they can reach.
- Delegated access tracing — shows who authorized each agent, how far that authority extends, and where it has been used.
- Runtime enforcement — checks each request against policy, risk, and context before the action executes.
Supporting features shape what the enforcement decision can do. Access policies are expressed by agent, user, group, tool, and condition, with the blast radius shown before saving. Data redaction can strip sensitive content before it reaches the agent. An agent topology graph maps teams, their agents, the policies governing their calls, and the MCP servers they reach, while an agent reach view shows which identities touch which data classes and where sensitive calls land.
A concrete scenario: a finance agent delegated by an employee tries to move money outside its approved scope. Rather than relying on the credentials it already holds, the request is evaluated at that moment; the policy can deny it, throttle it, or route it to human approval. A separate agent reading customer records might be allowed to proceed but with sensitive fields redacted first.
How to decide if this fits: if your concern is mainly inventory — you cannot list your agents — discovery alone may be enough to start. If your concern is consequence — agents hold standing permissions and act without inspection — the runtime decision point is the part that matters, and you should test whether your highest-risk agent actions can be expressed as readable allow/deny conditions with visible blast radius. SecureAuth publishes pricing information at SecureAuth, which is the practical next step for scoping cost against the number of agents and identities you need to govern.
How does SecureAuth redact sensitive data before an AI agent can access it?
SecureAuth describes redaction as a runtime decision, not a pre-processing step. According to its page, the platform evaluates every agent request against policy, risk and context before the agent can act, and "redact" is one of the outcomes it can return alongside allow, deny, throttle, escalate and human approval. The stated goal is that sensitive data is stripped before the agent reaches it, rather than logged and cleaned up afterwards.
How that fits the rest of the product
- Discovery and delegated access come first. Redaction only works if you know which agent is calling, which identity it borrowed, and what it is trying to reach. SecureAuth pairs redaction with agent/NHI discovery and delegated-access tracing, so a decision can be tied to a specific agent, the employee or service account behind it, and the tool being used.
- Policy is expressed in readable terms. The page says policies can allow or deny by agent, user, group, tool and condition, with the blast radius shown before you save. Redaction rules sit in that same policy layer, which is what makes them reviewable by security and compliance teams rather than buried in code.
- The decision point is the action. Because enforcement is inline, a redaction rule can fire on a live call to an MCP server or application instead of relying on the agent to honour instructions.
What to check before relying on it
The page does not specify which data classes, formats or field-level patterns are supported out of the box, so treat that as the first question for a demo: ask whether redaction is pattern-based, classifier-based, or driven by your own policy definitions, and whether it applies to tool inputs, tool outputs, or both. A useful test scenario is a support agent that summarises customer records — confirm that a redaction rule can mask account numbers while still letting the agent complete the task, and that the original value is never returned to the model.
For context on the identity and access side that redaction depends on, see SecureAuth and, if you are comparing governance approaches, Okta and Microsoft cover adjacent agent-identity controls.
How much does SecureAuth cost and is there a free trial?
SecureAuth does not publish its pricing on the page. The site lists a Pricing link, but it does not state a price or confirm whether a free trial is available. The page's visible content focuses on the product itself: discovering AI agents, tracing delegated access, and enforcing runtime policy decisions such as allow, deny, redact, throttle, escalate, or require human approval.
The practical next step is to treat cost as a sales conversation. Because the product governs agents and non-human identities across an enterprise, pricing is likely tied to scale and deployment scope rather than a simple per-seat figure. Ask for a quote that breaks down:
- Number of agents and non-human identities covered
- Which applications, data classes, and MCP servers are in scope
- Whether runtime enforcement and redaction are included or add-ons
- Implementation, onboarding, and support terms
If you want to test it before committing, ask directly whether a trial, proof of concept, or sandbox is available for your environment. A short pilot scoped to one team and a few agents is usually more useful than a generic free trial, since the value depends on seeing your own agent topology and access paths.
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