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What is Is OpenBSD secure?

Is OpenBSD secure? is a small single-purpose site that hosts the slides from a 2019 conference talk titled "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations," given at 36c3 on 29 December 2019. It is a reference page for one technical presentation, not a general security portal, blog or product site. The page also points to a recording of the talk, and it notes that the slides remain reachable even with JavaScript disabled.

What it is useful for

  • Getting the primary material directly. If you have heard the claim that OpenBSD is unusually secure and want the underlying analysis rather than secondhand summaries, the slides are the starting document.
  • Following an argument step by step. Slide decks suit readers who want to see how each mitigation was assessed and where the speaker drew conclusions, without watching a full recording first.
  • Pairing slides with the talk. Watching the video alongside the slides helps with points that are spoken rather than written on the slides.
  • A concrete scenario: a developer or systems administrator evaluating OpenBSD for a firewall or exposed service can read the deck, note which mitigations are discussed, and then check those features against the current OpenBSD release, since the evaluation dates from 2019.

Limits to keep in mind

The site is a snapshot of one talk from one point in time. It is not maintained documentation, and it does not track later OpenBSD releases or respond to subsequent research. Treat its conclusions as the speaker's assessment, and verify current behaviour against the project's own materials.

Next step

Start with the slides, then confirm any mitigation you care about in current OpenBSD documentation at OpenBSD. For broader context on the 36c3 conference, see Chaos Computer Club.

How does OpenBSD's security compare to other operating systems?

OpenBSD's security reputation rests mainly on proactive hardening and code-audit discipline rather than on matching every feature of general-purpose systems. The site Is OpenBSD secure? frames the question around a systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations, presented at 36c3 in December 2019, with slides and a talk video. That is a useful starting point for comparing mitigation design across systems, but it is a snapshot of one evaluation, not a live scoreboard.

Where the comparison actually differs

Dimension OpenBSD's typical stance What general-purpose systems often do
Default posture Secure-by-default, minimal services enabled Broader defaults, more exposed surface
Mitigation engineering Exploit mitigations built into the base system and toolchain Mitigations vary by kernel, distro or vendor
Code review culture Ongoing audit of base-system code Varies widely; often dependent on vendor process
Ecosystem breadth Smaller, curated package set Much larger software catalogues and integrations
Usability trade-off Some conveniences sacrificed for consistency Convenience and compatibility prioritised

The practical reading: OpenBSD tends to win on consistency of hardening and a small, audited base, while other systems win on breadth of software, hardware support and enterprise tooling. "More secure" depends on the threat model — a minimal internet-facing server benefits differently from a workstation that must run mainstream commercial applications.

A concrete way to decide

If you are choosing for a small exposed service — a firewall, DNS resolver or VPN endpoint — compare how much configuration each candidate needs before it is safely locked down, and how much of the mitigation work is already done for you. Then check whether the software you actually need runs on it. For a desktop where users install arbitrary applications, weigh the smaller ecosystem against the hardening benefits.

For a next step, review the talk's slides and video linked from Is OpenBSD secure? and map each mitigation it discusses to the specific system you are evaluating; treat the 2019 findings as design principles to verify against current releases rather than as a final verdict.

What security mitigations does OpenBSD implement?

OpenBSD's security reputation rests on a long series of exploit mitigations built into the base system and enabled by default. The site Is OpenBSD secure? hosts the slides from a 2019 36c3 talk, "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations," which catalogues and evaluates these mechanisms — useful if you want a structured overview rather than marketing claims.

Mitigations you'll encounter

  • W^X enforcement: memory pages are either writable or executable, not both, which blocks classic shellcode injection and JIT-style abuse outside explicitly permitted cases.
  • Address space layout randomization (ASLR): randomized placement of stack, libraries and mmap regions to frustrate memory-corruption exploits.
  • Stack protector and stack-gap/guard pages: canaries plus unmapped guard regions to catch overflows early.
  • Privilege separation: core daemons (sshd, httpd, pledge-using tools) split into small privileged and unprivileged processes.
  • pledge and unveil: system-call and filesystem-access restrictions that let programs declare the narrow set of operations they need, shrinking the attack surface if compromised.
  • Kernel and userland hardening: relaxed-PIE by default, retguard, and other compiler-level protections applied across the base system.

How to use this

Read the 36c3 slides as an audit-style map: for each mitigation, note what class of bug it targets and where it can be bypassed. That framing helps you judge whether OpenBSD fits a firewall, router or exposed-service role — and where you still need application-level defenses.

Should I use OpenBSD for a security-sensitive server?

OpenBSD is a reasonable choice for a security-sensitive server, but "secure by default" is a starting position, not a finished answer. The site Is OpenBSD secure? frames the question around a systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations presented at 36c3 in December 2019, which is the right way to think about it: judge the platform by which specific attacks its mitigations actually block, and which they leave to you.

What the platform gives you

OpenBSD's value on a server is mostly in defaults and discipline rather than in any single feature:

  • A small, conservative base system that is developed and audited as one unit, so there are fewer moving parts to misconfigure than a general-purpose Linux distribution with a large package set.
  • Exploit mitigations compiled in by default, which raise the cost of turning a memory-safety bug into remote code execution.
  • Privilege separation and privilege dropping in many daemons, so a compromised service runs with less authority.
  • Security-minded defaults in areas like packet filtering and service exposure, which reward administrators who leave things alone.

What it does not do for you

No operating system fixes a server that exposes an unnecessary service, runs an outdated web application, or hands out broad SSH access. The 36c3 evaluation is useful precisely because it examines mitigations individually: some attacks are meaningfully harder, others are only partially addressed, and the practical benefit depends on your workload. A memory-safety-hardened kernel matters a great deal for a network-facing C daemon; it matters much less for a Python application whose main risk is an unpatched dependency.

A decision guide

Your situation OpenBSD fits well OpenBSD may cost you
Role Firewall, router, DNS, mail, OpenSSH bastion, small static site Application stacks needing vendor binaries, containers, or GPU/commercial software
Team Comfortable with BSD layout, pf, and manual configuration Strong Linux tooling and hiring pipeline you would lose
Update model You want a predictable release cadence with a clear patch stream You need frequent, granular package updates from a huge ecosystem
Performance Modest, well-understood workloads Heavy multi-core throughput or niche hardware support

A practical next step

List the three most likely ways your server could be compromised — for example an exposed service with a memory-safety bug, a weak SSH posture, or an unpatched application — then check for each whether OpenBSD's defaults remove the risk or merely reduce it. If most risks land in the application layer, the operating system choice matters less than patch discipline, minimal exposure, and logging. If they land in network-facing system software, OpenBSD's defaults are a genuine advantage. Whichever you choose, plan for timely security patches and a tested restore path; those decide more outcomes than the kernel's hardening flags.

What are the limitations of OpenBSD's security features?

OpenBSD's security features reduce whole classes of risk, but they are not a complete security model. They defend the operating system and its bundled tools; they do not protect against misconfiguration, weak application logic, phishing, or an attacker who already has valid credentials.

Where the limits show up

  • Userland and configuration errors. Privilege separation, pledge and unveil constrain what a compromised program can do, but they depend on programs being written to use them. Third-party software installed from ports or packages may not adopt these mechanisms, and an administrator can still grant excessive access or expose a service unnecessarily.
  • Mitigations are not guarantees. Address-space randomization, W^X and similar hardening raise the cost of exploitation; they do not make memory-safety bugs unexploitable. A determined attacker with a suitable bug can still find a path, especially in code that was not designed around these constraints.
  • Scope is the base system. The project's own claims and audits centre on the base system and its defaults. Applications you add, web content, and user behaviour sit outside that boundary.
  • Usability trade-offs. Strict defaults can break software that expects looser behaviour, and the workarounds people apply (disabling a feature, loosening a pledge promise) can quietly undo the protection.
  • Evaluation is dated and partial. The site presents slides from a 2019 talk systematically evaluating OpenBSD's mitigations, so its assessment reflects the state of the code and the threat model at that time rather than current releases.

A practical next step

Treat OpenBSD as a strong foundation and layer your own controls: minimise exposed services, keep the base system and packages patched, review pledge/unveil coverage for anything you deploy, and monitor logs for unexpected behaviour. If you are choosing between platforms, compare not just hardening features but how much of your actual workload the defaults cover.

For background on the project's own security posture, see OpenBSD.

How can I access the 36c3 talk slides and video on OpenBSD security?

The site provides both the slides and the video for the 36c3 talk "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations" (given 29 December 2019). The page notes that the slide deck and the recording are each reachable through a link on the page; it also states that the slides remain available even if JavaScript is disabled, so a plain browser visit is enough to get to them.

Practical route

  1. Open Is OpenBSD secure? in any browser.
  2. Use the "slides" link for the deck and the "video" link for the recording.
  3. If a script blocker hides anything, reload with JavaScript off as the page advises—the slide link is intended to work either way.

The talk is a systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations, so it suits readers weighing exploit-mitigation trade-offs rather than looking for a general "is it secure?" verdict. For background on the project's own security claims, compare with OpenBSD.

Related questions

More questions →
What to Consider When Using isopenbsdsecu.re as a Source on OpenBSD Security

isopenbsdsecu.re is a single-purpose reference page that hosts the slides and video of a 2019 conference talk, "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations," presented at 36c3 on December 29, 2019. It is useful as a pointer to a structured third-party evaluation of OpenBSD's exploit mitigations, but it is not an official OpenBSD statement, not a current audit, and not a general verdict on whether OpenBSD is "secure." Treat it as one dated input among several, and read the slides and video together rather than relying on the page's title question.

What the site actually contains

The page's own text is minimal: a heading asking "Is OpenBSD secure?" and a note that the slides and video from the 36c3 talk are available, with a fallback message that the site works even with JavaScript disabled. There is no summary of findings, no methodology write-up, and no update log on the page itself.

That means the site functions as an index, not an analysis. The substance lives in the linked slides and recording. If you cite "isopenbsdsecu.re says OpenBSD is/isn't secure," you are citing a title, not a conclusion.

What you get What you don't get
Links to slides and video of a 36c3 talk A written summary of results on the page
A named, dated, traceable source Updates after December 2019
A mitigation-focused evaluation Coverage of OpenBSD as a whole
Access without JavaScript Official OpenBSD project endorsement

Check the date before you rely on it

The talk was given on December 29, 2019. OpenBSD, like any operating system, changes its mitigation set over time: features get added, defaults change, and older protections get reworked or replaced. A 2019 evaluation describes the state of the code and the threat model as the speaker assessed them then.

Practical implications:

  • For historical or methodological questions — how someone systematically evaluated OpenBSD mitigations, what categories they used, what they found at the time — the material is appropriate and citable with the date attached.
  • For current claims — "OpenBSD does/doesn't have mitigation X today" — verify against current OpenBSD documentation, release notes, and source. Do not carry a 2019 finding forward as a present-tense fact.
  • When writing, always attach the year: "a 2019 systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations (36c3)" rather than "an evaluation shows."

Understand the scope: mitigations, not "security"

The talk's subject is OpenBSD's mitigations — the hardening techniques intended to make exploitation harder. That is a narrower question than "is OpenBSD secure," which also depends on code quality, default configuration, privilege separation, patch cadence, and how the system is deployed.

Two consequences:

  1. A finding that a particular mitigation is weak, incomplete, or bypassable does not by itself establish that the system is insecure in practice.
  2. A finding that mitigations are strong does not cover configuration, administration, or non-mitigation bugs.

When you use the material, state the scope explicitly: "this evaluates mitigation measures," not "this evaluates OpenBSD's overall security."

It is a third-party evaluation, not project documentation

The site is independent of the OpenBSD project. That is not a reason to dismiss it — external evaluation is valuable precisely because it is independent — but it changes how you weigh it:

  • Use it for: an outside perspective, a structured checklist of what to examine, and specific technical claims you can then verify in the source tree or official docs.
  • Don't use it for: authoritative statements of what OpenBSD supports, recommends, or guarantees. For those, go to the OpenBSD project's own documentation and release materials.
  • Watch for: claims that are presented as general conclusions but rest on specific test conditions. Check the slides for the assumptions behind each result.

How to read the slides and video together

The page points to both formats, and they carry different information. The slides hold the structured claims, tables, and terminology; the video carries the speaker's caveats, qualifications, and answers that often do not appear on slides.

A workable approach:

  1. Open the slides first and note each claim and the condition it depends on.
  2. Watch the corresponding segment of the video for the speaker's stated limits and any audience Q&A that qualifies a result.
  3. For any claim you intend to repeat, check it against current OpenBSD source or documentation before publishing.
  4. Record the source as: talk title, conference (36c3), date (December 29, 2019), and the specific slide or timestamp.

If JavaScript is disabled, the page states the slides and video remain accessible — so a script-blocked browser is not a barrier to the material itself.

A quick decision guide

Your task Is this source suitable?
Explaining how to systematically evaluate OS mitigations Yes — as a worked example, with the 2019 date
Making a current claim about a specific OpenBSD mitigation Only as a starting point; verify against current source
Describing OpenBSD's official security position No — use project documentation
Giving a general verdict on OpenBSD's security No — scope is too narrow and the material is dated
Finding further reading or a talk to watch Yes — the page is a direct pointer

The short version: use isopenbsdsecu.re to find and cite a specific, dated, third-party mitigation evaluation, keep its scope and year attached to every claim you draw from it, and confirm anything present-tense against current OpenBSD sources.

What Is the isopenbsdsecu.re Website?

isopenbsdsecu.re is a small single-purpose site that hosts the slides from a 2019 conference talk titled "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations," presented at 36c3 on December 29, 2019. It is not an official OpenBSD project site and does not publish its own security research; it serves as an access point to that talk's materials, with links to the slides and the talk video.

What the Site Provides

The page is essentially a landing page for one presentation. According to the site's own text, it contains the slides of the 36c3 talk and points visitors to two resources:

  • The slides — available via a link on the page
  • The video — available via a separate link on the page

The page also notes that it works even if JavaScript is disabled, so the links remain accessible without scripts.

What It Is Not

A few boundaries are worth keeping in mind:

  • Not official. The site is not run by the OpenBSD project, so nothing on it should be read as an official statement from OpenBSD developers.
  • Not a live assessment. The content dates from December 2019. It reflects the state of OpenBSD's mitigations as evaluated for that talk, not the current state of the project.
  • Not a general security resource. There is no blog, no ongoing commentary, and no comparison of operating systems beyond what the talk itself covers.

When It Is Useful

The site is worth visiting if you want to watch or cite that specific 36c3 talk — for example, if you are researching how OpenBSD's exploit mitigations were systematically evaluated, or if you want the slide deck to follow along with the video. If you need current information about OpenBSD security, the project's own documentation and mailing lists are the appropriate sources; this site only preserves one 2019 presentation.

Where the OpenBSD Security Evaluation on isopenbsdsecu.re Comes From

The evaluation on isopenbsdsecu.re comes from a talk titled "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations," delivered at 36c3 (the 36th Chaos Communication Congress) on December 29, 2019. The site hosts the talk's slides, with a link to the recorded video, so you can check any claim against the original presentation.

What the site actually is

isopenbsdsecu.re is a single-purpose page built around that one talk. Its heading poses the question "Is OpenBSD secure?" and the body points visitors to the slide deck and video rather than offering an independent write-up. In practice, it works as a pointer to primary material: if you want to know what the evaluation found, you go to the slides or the recording.

The page also notes that it remains readable with JavaScript disabled, with the slides and video available through direct links.

Why the source matters for the question

OpenBSD's security reputation rests largely on its long-standing focus on code auditing and exploit mitigation. A systematic evaluation is useful precisely because it tests those claims against implementation rather than reputation. Because the site defers to the 36c3 talk, the talk itself — not the landing page — is the authoritative source for:

  • which mitigations were examined and how each was assessed
  • what the evaluation concluded about their effectiveness
  • the caveats and scope limits the speaker stated

How to use it

  1. Open isopenbsdsecu.re and follow the slides link for the structured argument, or the video link for the spoken context and any Q&A.
  2. Treat the 2019 date as a boundary: findings describe OpenBSD as it stood at that time, and later releases may differ.
  3. Cite the talk (title, 36c3, December 29, 2019) rather than the landing page when referencing specific conclusions.

If your goal is a quick verdict on whether OpenBSD is "secure," the site won't give you one — it gives you the evidence and the reasoning behind one evaluation, which is the more defensible starting point.

How to View the isopenbsdsecu.re Slides and Video Without JavaScript

The isopenbsdsecu.re page works without JavaScript. When scripting is disabled, it shows a short notice that this is fine and points you to two plain links: one for the slides and one for the video. Open either link directly to get the material; no script, account, or special viewer is needed.

What the page actually provides

The site is a single page presenting the slides from the talk A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations, given at 36c3 on 29 December 2019. The page's own text describes it as the slide deck for that talk, with a link to the slides and a link to the video.

The page is built so that the core content does not depend on JavaScript. With scripting off, you see a fallback message instead of any script-driven embed, and that message contains the same two destinations.

Steps to get the slides and video

  1. Open the site with JavaScript disabled. Load isopenbsdsecu.re in a browser where scripting is turned off (for example, a hardened profile or a browser set to block scripts by default).
  2. Read the fallback notice. Instead of an embedded viewer, the page states that JavaScript is disabled and that this is acceptable, then offers the links.
  3. Follow the slides link. This takes you to the slide deck for the 36c3 talk. You can read it in the browser or download it for offline use.
  4. Follow the video link. This takes you to the recording of the talk. Watch it in the browser or open it in a separate media player if your setup prefers that.
  5. Verify you have the right material. The slides and video should both refer to the 36c3 talk from 29 December 2019 on OpenBSD's mitigations. If either link leads somewhere unrelated, you are likely on a stale or mirrored copy.

Common snags

  • No links visible at all. If the page appears blank rather than showing the fallback text, the page may not have loaded fully. Reload it; the fallback is plain HTML and should render without scripts.
  • A link opens an embedded player that stays empty. Some video hosts try to load a scripted player. If that happens, use the direct video URL from the link rather than any embedded frame, or open the link in a browser profile that permits the host's scripts only for that tab.
  • Slides fail to display inline. Slide decks are often PDFs or hosted viewers. If inline display fails, download the file and open it in a local PDF reader.
  • Confusing the talk with the site. The site is a presentation of one evaluation, not an ongoing security audit or a verdict service. Treat the slides and video as the primary sources and read them together.

Why the no-JavaScript path matters

The fallback is deliberate: the page's message treats disabled JavaScript as an acceptable way to reach the material. That makes the site usable in locked-down browsers, on text-only setups, and in environments where scripts are blocked for security reasons—fitting for a page about OpenBSD's own mitigations. The practical takeaway is simple: if scripts are off, look for the notice and use its two links; the slides and the 36c3 video are the content, and everything else on the page is just presentation.

What Does the isopenbsdsecu.re Talk Conclude About OpenBSD's Security?

The isopenbsdsecu.re site is a single-purpose page that hosts the slides and video of a 36c3 conference talk, "A systematic evaluation of OpenBSD's mitigations," presented on December 29, 2019. The site itself does not state a verdict; it points readers to the slides and the recording as the authoritative source for the talk's findings. So the honest answer to "what does it conclude" is: the conclusion lives in those materials, and the page's role is to make them accessible.

What the page actually provides

The page is minimal by design. Its heading poses the question "Is OpenBSD secure?" and the body explains that the slides and video of the 36c3 talk are available, with direct links to both. It also notes that the page works without JavaScript — if scripting is disabled, the slides and video links are still reachable.

That structure tells you something about the site's intent: it is a pointer, not an argument. Anyone citing isopenbsdsecu.re as if the domain itself delivers a conclusion is misreading it.

Why the talk matters for the question

OpenBSD has a long-standing reputation for security-first engineering, and the talk's framing — a systematic evaluation of its mitigations — is aimed at testing that reputation against what the mitigations actually cover. A systematic evaluation is different from a feature list: it asks which classes of attack each mitigation addresses, where coverage is partial, and where gaps remain. That is the kind of analysis that can either confirm a reputation or qualify it.

How to get the actual conclusion

  1. Open isopenbsdsecu.re.
  2. Follow the slides link for the structured argument — the evaluation's scope, the mitigations examined, and the findings are laid out there.
  3. Use the video link for the presenter's narration, which typically adds context the slides compress, such as caveats and the reasoning behind each judgment.
  4. Read the conclusion against the talk's stated scope. An evaluation of mitigations speaks to exploit-hardening coverage; it is not a blanket audit of code quality, configuration, or operational practice.

Expected result: you finish with the talk's own findings rather than a secondhand summary, and you can tell which claims the evaluation supports and which it does not address.

Common pitfall

Treating the domain name as the answer. "Is OpenBSD secure?" is the talk's question, not its verdict — the page repeats the question and hands you the evidence. Conclusions drawn from the URL alone, without the slides or video, are unsupported.

What to keep in mind when reading the findings

  • Date matters. The talk is from December 2019. Mitigations and the codebase change; findings describe OpenBSD as evaluated then.
  • Scope matters. A mitigation review measures hardening against specific attack classes. It does not settle questions about default configuration, third-party software, or how a system is operated.
  • Source matters. The slides and video are the primary record. Summaries elsewhere, including this one, are secondary.

If your goal is to understand OpenBSD's security posture in a defensible way, watch the talk or read the slides, note the scope and date, and cite the 36c3 material directly rather than the landing page.

Website Overview

Identifiable technologies and additional version or configuration signals make the service easier to fingerprint, which may help targeted scanners narrow their checks. An established domain and managed infrastructure suggest continuity of operations and may support dependable delivery, although neither guarantees service quality.

Domain and Registration

Registered in 2019, this domain has about 7 years of history. That suggests continuity, although ownership and purpose may have changed. Registration contact information is publicly available through RDAP. The domain uses the common .re extension, which is not an independent safety signal.

DNS and Email

Nameservers are provided by Cloudflare, indicating managed DNS hosting. MX records point to the migadu.com email service. DNSSEC is enabled, allowing validating resolvers to authenticate signed DNS data. No CNAME was found; the observed records resolve directly to addresses. SPF and DMARC are configured. DKIM status is unknown.

TLS and Certificates

The public key uses EC with 256 bits. The server supplied a complete certificate chain. No organization name is present in the certificate; the available fields are consistent with domain validation. The certificate was issued within the Google Trust Services cloud or CDN ecosystem. The certificate's total validity is about 90 days, consistent with a short renewal cycle.

HTTP and Browser Security

The response lacks these common security headers: CSP, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, clickjacking protection. No X-Powered-By header was found, reducing one common source of backend fingerprinting information. The cf-ray response header indicates a CDN or caching proxy in the delivery path. No obvious internal addresses or debug information were found in the headers. The Server header identifies cloudflare without an exact version.

Technology Stack Analysis

The public page identifies Hugo 0.147.7, Cloudflare, with exact versions exposed for 1 technologies. These details can narrow vulnerability checks, although exposure alone is not a vulnerability.

Search and Social Sharing

No homepage meta description was detected, leaving snippet selection more dependent on page text. The Generator tag identifies Hugo 0.147.7, making the publishing system easier to fingerprint. No Open Graph metadata was detected, so social previews may depend on platform inference. The title has 18 characters, within a common display range. The observed directives allow indexing and link following.

Hosting and Email

DNSCloudflare
HostingCloudflare
Emailmigadu.com
Approximate IP geolocation (inferred; a CDN or proxy may differ from the origin server) Location unknown Inferred 104.21.86.152

Registration details

RDAP / WHOIS

RegistrarInfomaniak Network SA
Registered2019-07-12
Expires2027-07-12
Domain statusactive
Nameserversanuj.ns.cloudflare.com、wally.ns.cloudflare.com
DNSSECsigned

DNS records

DNS

TypeNameValueTTLPriority
Aisopenbsdsecu.re104.21.86.152300—
Aisopenbsdsecu.re172.67.221.77300—
AAAAisopenbsdsecu.re2606:4700:3031::6815:5698300—
AAAAisopenbsdsecu.re2606:4700:3032::ac43:dd4d300—
MXisopenbsdsecu.reaspmx1.migadu.com30010
MXisopenbsdsecu.reaspmx2.migadu.com30020
NSisopenbsdsecu.reanuj.ns.cloudflare.com86400—
NSisopenbsdsecu.rewally.ns.cloudflare.com86400—
TXTisopenbsdsecu.reca3-384c97799a3a48ddacd1a80b3a2db234300—
TXTisopenbsdsecu.rehosted-email-verify=h1xgjgov300—
TXTisopenbsdsecu.rev=spf1 include:spf.migadu.com -all300—
DSisopenbsdsecu.re2371 13 2 c500e733850296771804dab9899c3c328920e9c1611011e67023748ff622cb403600—
DMARC_dmarc.isopenbsdsecu.rev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:[email protected];300—

TLS and certificates

TLS / SSL

AssessmentNormal configuration
Supported protocolsTLSv1.2、TLSv1.3
Negotiated protocolTLSv1.3
Certificate subjectisopenbsdsecu.re
IssuerGoogle Trust Services
Valid until2026-12-18T09:45 · Remaining when checked: 49 days
Verification detailsCertificate trust: Passed · Hostname match: Passed

HTTP response headers

HTTP

HeaderValue
content-typetext/html
cache-controlpublic, max-age=0, must-revalidate
servercloudflare
strict-transport-securitymax-age=15552000; includeSubDomains; preload
x-content-type-optionsnosniff

Identified technologies

Hugo 0.147.7Cloudflare

Pages, Search and Sharing

Meta descriptionNot detected
Canonical URLhttps://isopenbsdsecu.re/
LanguageEnglish (default)
Twitter CardNot detected

Unknown

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